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Previous research has identified maintenance information as one of the primary causal 
factors of maintenance error. Incorrect maintenance information has also been cited as a 
contributing factor in a number of recent aircraft mishaps. To date no one has studied the 
types of errors found in aircraft maintenance manuals published by manufacturers. The 
purpose of this research is to analyze Publication Change Requests (PCRs) to document 
the most frequently reported types of errors found in aircraft maintenance manual, to 
identify how errors vary across Air Transport Association (ATA) chapters, and identify the 
corrective actions required to address the cited problem. The most common request was 
for additional procedural information followed by requests to add or change the language 
to improve clarity. The results show that the majority of PCRs (42%) cited procedures 
found in Chapters 27 (Flight controls), 32 (Landing gear), and 71 (Powerplant).
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Classification and Analysis of Errors Reported 
in Aircraft Maintenance Manuals
In 2003, Air Midwest Beechcraft 1900D with 19 passengers and 2 crew crashed 
shortly after takeoff. The National Transportation Safety Board accident investiga-
tion (NTSB, 2004b) revealed that the airplane’s elevator control system was incor-
rectly rigged during a maintenance check restricting the airplanes elevator travel. 
The report cited Air Midwest’s maintenance procedures and documentation as one 
of four probable causes of the accident. Eight months later, another fatal mishap 
involving a Beechcraft 1900D occurred due to an incorrectly rigged elevator trim. 
The National Transportation Safety Board determined (NTSB, 2004a) that the 
probable cause(s) of the accident were as follows: 
The improper replacement of the forward elevator trim cable, and subse-
quent inadequate functional check of the maintenance performed, which 
resulted in a reversal of the elevator trim system and a loss of control in-
flight. Factors were the flight crew’s failure to follow the checklist proce-
dures, and the aircraft manufacturer’s erroneous depiction of the elevator 
trim drum in the maintenance (p 2). 
The two accidents illustrate the critical role of maintenance practices and of 
the supporting maintenance documentation to flying safety. These maintenance 
related accidents are not isolated events. Analyses of major commercial aircraft 
accidents that occurred between 1959 and 1983 reveal that maintenance and 
inspection deficiencies account for 12% to 15% of commercial mishaps and are 
the fourth leading cause of accidents (Sears, 1986). Maintenance deficiencies 
account for a similar proportion (e.g., 17%) of naval aviation mishaps resulting in 
the loss of an aircraft or fatality (Ricci, 2003).
Causal Factors of Maintenance Error
Maintenance errors have a variety of causes and these causes can be orga-
nized into three broad categories. There are errors that 1) represent a failure to 
properly execute a correct plan of action; 2) errors resulting from the execution of 
an inadequate plan and 3) intentionally choosing a course of action that is a viola-
tion of formal rules and established procedures or that deviates from unofficial 
norms or standard practice (Reason & Hobbs, 2003). In the first case, an error may 
result from a misidentification of a signal or the failure to detect a defect during 
inspection. An Aviation Maintenance Technician (AMT) may misread an instrument 
or fail to detect a crack due to poor lighting or an interruption while performing a 
visual inspection. In the second case, errors typically arise from the misapplication 
of a useful rule or the application of a bad rule. For instance, a maintainer may 
develop a rule regarding what the standard torque values or tolerances for an air-
craft component may be but fail to identify exceptions to the rule thereby leading to 
an error. Alternatively, a maintainer may adopt a habit that becomes part of their 
routine when performing a maintenance procedure but which has unintended con-
sequences. In the late 1970’s at one airline it became standard practice to use a 
forklift to support the engine/pylon assembly on DC-10s when replacing the 
assembly (NTSB, 1979). The use of the forklift in some cases caused unintended 
structural damage that resulted in a subsequent engine separation on takeoff and 
the loss of one aircraft, its passengers, and crew. Unlike the first two cases, a dis-
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tinguishing characteristic of violations is that they are often intentional, not with 
the aim of bringing about bad consequences but rather to circumvent mainte-
nance procedures. These procedures might be incorrect, lacking sufficient detail, 
unduly complicated, and/or burdensome. In addition, organizational and situa-
tional factors including short staffing, lack of appropriate tools, and situational 
considerations (i.e., on time departure and arrival) may predispose AMTs to 
engage in such behavior. 
Several recent studies have sought to identify and classify the causal factors 
that contribute to maintenance error (A. Chaparro, Groff, Chaparro, & Scarlett, 
2002; Hobbs & Williamson, 2003; Marx & Graeber, 1994; Patankar & Kanki, 2001; 
Ricci, 2003). Lattanzio, Patankar, and  Kanki (2008) analyzed reports from AMTs 
submitted via the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) using MEDA (Main-
tenance Errors Decision Aid), a tool used to  investigate and identify contributing 
factors to maintenance incidents (Rankin, Allen, & Sargent, 1998). The MEDA 
analysis identified 458 ASRS reports describing a procedural error that were 
defined as “information not understandable,” “information incorrect,” “information 
not enough,” “information not used,” and “information unavailable.” They per-
formed a content analysis of the 458 ASRS reports to identify and characterize 
the top 10% of reports that were most representative of the larger set. This anal-
ysis indicated that maintenance information (i.e., procedures in the Aviation Main-
tenance Manual (AMM), task cards, job cards, service bulletins, etc) was a sig-
nificant causal factor of maintenance error. Table 1 shows the most commonly 
reported document deficiencies cited in the reports. 
Table 1
The most frequently cited maintenance deficiencies cited in maintenance 
related ASRS reports.
Document Deficiencies %    (N=46)
Missing information 48
Incorrect Information 19
Difficult to interpret 19
Conflicting information 19
The results of Lattanzio et al. (2008) are in accord with other published find-
ings. McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, & Cromie (2000) conducted a survey on the use 
of maintenance manual procedures as part of a larger study on organization 
aspects of safety. Thirty-four percent of their respondents reported performing 
routine maintenance tasks in ways different from those outlined in the documen-
tation. The two most frequently cited reasons for not following the manual were 
that there was an easier and there was a faster method of performing the proce-
dure. Similarly, a survey of Australian maintenance technicians (Hobbs & Wil-
liamson, 2000)  found that 47% of respondents reported having opted to perform 
a maintenance procedure in a way they felt was superior to that described by the 
manual. 
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Maintenance technicians also cite problems with unclear or confusing proce-
dures. Sixty percent of respondents in one survey (Hobbs & Williamson, 2000) 
reported continuation of an unfamiliar task despite not being sure if they were per-
forming it correctly and 67% reported they had been misled by maintenance docu-
mentation. Chaparro, Groff, et al. (2002) found that 18% of the respondents 
reported parts being damaged, 20% reported assembling a component incorrectly, 
and 25% reported having adjusted or rigged a system incorrectly because of 
unclear or misleading procedures.
Maintenance Manual Regulatory Requirements 
Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 25.1529 (FAA 2008a) outlines the obli-
gation of manufacturers to provide the technical instructions necessary to support 
continued airworthiness of the aircraft. The manuals must include information 
about all equipment installed on the aircraft, including equipment made by third 
party manufacturers. Manual content requirements are also outlined for system 
descriptions, maintenance and inspection procedures, required scheduled mainte-
nance, and information about system tests and service points.
The organization of the maintenance manual is specified by the Air Transport 
Association’s Information Standards for Aviation Maintenance (Air Transport Asso-
ciation, 2008) which defines the organizational structure of the AMM and the sub-
ject matter to be covered in each chapter. For instance, Chapters 27, 32, and 71 
only contain information related to Flight Controls, Landing Gear, and Powerplants, 
respectively. While the Air Transport Association (ATA) format specifies a high level 
of organization of the AMM, the formatting, content and level of detail found the 
chapters differs amongst the manufacturers. Although the FAA requires the manu-
facturers to provide maintenance manuals, precise requirements regarding the 
content of the manuals are not defined. The manuals must be accepted by the FAA 
as part of the aircraft’s maintenance program, but the procedural content within the 
manual itself is not approved by the FAA. 
According to FAA regulation FAR § 43.13 (FAA 2008b), an AMT is required to 
follow procedures outlined in the aircraft maintenance manual. However, there are 
occasions where situational factors may conspire against strict adherence to the 
AMM. There can be considerable pressure on AMTs to minimize aircraft down time 
and return it to service (Hobbs & Williamson, 2000). Under these circumstances, 
mechanics may be more prone to workaround an inadequate procedure rather 
than contact a manufacturer’s technical support for clarification of the maintenance 
procedure. Unlike maintenance errors that results from the incorrect execution or 
interpretation of a maintenance procedure the term workaround refers to situations 
where a mechanic is aware of a problem with an existing maintenance procedure 
and then relies on their knowledge and experience or that of their coworkers to 
identify a means of accomplishing the task. Using the terminology of error analysis 
the workaround is a violation because it represents a deviation from standard safe 
operating practices (Reason & Hobbs, 2003) but unlike other types of violations, 
they are a response to perceived problems with maintenance documentation.
Research Purpose
The majority of corrections to maintenance manuals are made after their pub-
lication (A Chaparro & Groff, 2001). Typically, errors are identified by an AMT per-
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forming the procedures who may either contact a manufacturer’s customer ser-
vice engineer for correction/clarification or attempt to identify how to perform the 
procedure. In the former case, the customer service engineer will verify the error, 
identify a solution, and decide where to submit a Publication Change Request 
(PCR) to the technical publications department. 
PCRs represent an important source of information regarding the quantity, 
frequency, and distribution of errors found in the AMM. PCRs can offer insight into 
why AMTs intentionally deviate from the AMM. PCRs are also likely to be more 
representative of the errors found in maintenance documentation than analyses 
based on reports of incidents or accidents. The purpose of this research is to 
analyze user feedback in the form of PCRs, to document the most frequently 
reported types of errors found in the AMMs, to identify how errors vary across Air 
Transport Association (ATA) chapters, and identify the corrective actions taken by 
the OEM. These data could provide valuable information for the development of 
interventions to improve maintenance documentation and related causal factors 
in maintenance errors.
Method
Four aircraft manufacturers, including two general aviation business jet man-
ufacturers and two commercial aircraft manufacturers, agreed to provide PCRs 
for analysis. Manufacturers were asked to provide a chronological sample of up 
to 200 PCRs. In one case, this sample represented all of the PCRs pertaining to 
one aircraft model. As part of the agreement to provide PCRs, which are propri-
etary documents, the manufacturers were assured anonymity. As such, neither 
the manufacturers nor the aircraft models are associated with the results. Anal-
ysis of this data includes the classification of the types of errors reported, the 
corrective action requested, and the ATA chapter codes of the requested changes. 
Only PCRs pertaining to the AMM were included in the analysis. 
PCRs were classified using an error taxonomy developed previously (A. 
Chaparro, Rogers, Hamblin, & Chaparro, 2004). The taxonomy classifies each 
change request into one of four error types (Technical, Language, Procedural, 
and Graphics) and 15 error reasons (see Table 2). The associated corrective 
action made to the manual (i.e., add, delete, or change information) was also 
recorded for each change request.
Table 2
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Four researchers coded the comments contained in the PCRs using the error 
taxonomy. A Cohen’s Kappa (қ) of .78 was calculated on a sample of 25 PCRs 
reflecting an excellent level of consistency between the coders. Values between 
.40 and .75 represent fair to good, above .75 as excellent, agreement beyond 
chance (Fleiss, 1981). 
Results
A total of 467 PCRs were analyzed. The PCRs contained multiple change 
requests and each request for change served as a data point. The result was 879 
requests for changes, a mean ratio of 1.88:1 (range 2.7 to 1.6:1) change requests 
per PCR. Due to the unequal number of PCRs collected from each manufacturer, 
results will be shown as a percent of total by manufacturer. One manufacturer had 
sufficient requests related to aircraft effectivity, which warranted the creation of a 
new category. Effectivity pertains to the applicability of a procedure to a specific 
airplane. For example, a procedure may be applicable for some aircraft of a given 
model but not others due to customer modifications or engineering changes imple-
mented in later production aircraft.
Table 3
Breakdown of Error Type for each manufacturer
SOURCE
Error Type (%)
Procedural Language Technical Graphic Effectivity
Manufacturer A 44.5 26.0 14.5 15.0 0.0
Manufacturer B 34.7 28.1 17.4 7.9 12.0
Manufacturer C 42.7 41.2 14.7 1.4 0.0
Manufacturer D 48.2 24.3 19.5 8.0 0.0
M = 42.5 29.9 16.5 8.1 n/a
Table 3 shows the types of errors reported in the PCRs and table 4 shows a 
summary of the corrective actions (Add, Change, and Delete) requested in the 
PCRs broken down by manufacturer. Procedural and language errors were the 
most frequently reported problems; in fact, for all of the manufacturers, procedural 
and language requests comprise an average 73% of all PCRs (range 62.8% to 
83.9%). Almost 90% of the requests involved the change or addition of information 
to the AMM (see Table 4).
Table 4




Manufacturer A 64.6 33.0  2.4
Manufacturer B 48.8 39.3 12.0
Manufacturer C 41.7 43.1 15.2
Manufacturer D 47.8 43.8  8.4
M = 50.7 39.8  9.5
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Procedural Errors
The most frequent requests were within the Procedural category. Common 
procedural errors were categorized as Step(s), Ordering, Alternate method, 
Check/Test/Inspection, Caution/Warning. Step(s) refers to a request for individual 
steps within a procedure to be added, changed or deleted; whereas, when a spe-
cific type of step(s) was referred to in the PCR, i.e., request for Alternate Method, 
Check/Test and Caution/Warning, it was recorded. Ordering refers to requests for 
a change in the sequence of steps by separating, combining, or reordering indi-
vidual steps. 
Table 5




     Corrective Action (%)
Add Delete Change % of Total
Step(s) A 26.0 0 3.0 29.0
B 20.7 4.2 2.8 27.7
C 18.0 9.5 2.4 29.9
D 21.7 5.3 8.8 35.8
M = 21.6 4.8 4.3 30.6
Order A 0 0 0 0
B 0 0 2.3 2.3
C 0 0 0.5 0.5
D 0 0 0 0
M= 0 0 0.7 0.7
Alternative A 1.0 0 0 1.0
B 1.9 0 0 1.9
C 0 0 0 0
D 0.4 0 0.9 1.3
M= 0.8 0 0.2 1.1
Check/test A 7.5 0 0.5 8.0
B 5.2 0.5 0.5 6.1
C 4.3 0 1.4 5.7
D 3.5 0.4 2.7 6.6
M = 5.1 0.2 1.3 6.6
Caution/Warning A 5.0 0 0.5 5.5
B 1.4 0 0 1.4
C 0.5 0 0 0.5
D 2.7 0 0 2.7
M= 2.4 0 0.1 2.5
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As shown in Table 5, the most frequently reported Procedural errors were 
found with the Step(s) category (m = 30.6%). The second category was Check/
Test step(s) (m = 6.6%), followed by Caution/Warning step(s) (m = 2.5%).
Language Errors
Language errors found in the PCRs included typographical errors (Typos), 
grammatical errors (Grammar), a need for clarification of the information (Clarity), 
and inaccurate information within a step (Incorrect).
Table 6
Percentage of corrective actions and types of Language request reasons via 




Add Delete Change % of Total
Typo/grammar
A 0 0 0 0
B 0 0 0 0
C 0 0 0.5 0.5
D 0 0 0.9 0.9
M= 0 0 0.35 0.35
Clarity
A 13.5 1.0 5.0 19.5
B 15.5 0 2.3 17.8
C 13.3 1.9 16.1 31.3
D   9.7 1.3 8.4 19.5
M = 13.0 1.1 8.0 22.0
Incorrect information
A 0 1.5 5.5 7.0
B 0 1.9 12.2 14.1
C 0 3.8 11.8 15.6
D   0.4 0 4.9 5.3
M =   0.1 1.8 8.6 10.5
As seen in Table 6, the most frequently reported Language error was Clarity 
(m = 22%) with users most often requesting additional information (m = 13%) or 
changing information (m = 8%) to improve clarity. The second most frequent Lan-
guage error was Incorrect information (m = 10.5%) with users requesting either a 
change (m = 8.6%) or deletion (m = 1.8%).
Analysis by ATA Chapter
The ATA chapters were also recorded during classification. Analysis shows 
that the distribution, types of errors reported and requested corrections were sim-
ilar across the four manufacturers. The most frequent errors reported were found 
in the chapters related to Flight controls (Chapters 27), Landing gear (32), and 
Powerplant (71).
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Chapter 27 (Flight Controls) was faulted most often followed by Chapter 32 
(Landing Gear), both consisting primarily of Procedural and Language errors 
while most of the errors in Chapter 71 (Powerplant) were Technical. Errors in 
Graphics were rarely reported. In Chapters 27 and 32, corrective actions to add 
information were approximately twice as frequent as requests for changes. A 
small number of requests for deleting information were found in all chapters.
Discussion
We examined the PCRs provided by four aircraft manufacturers to identify 
the types of errors most commonly reported in AMMs, their distribution across 
ATA chapters and the types of changes required to address the comments sub-
mitted by users. Submission of PCRs was discretionary and consequently may 
not provide a complete picture of the difficulties experienced by the users. Whiles 
PCRs do offer insight into the types of errors found in AMMs they provide little 
insight into the role of organizational culture or situational factors that contribute 
to errors or the number or types of errors found in other forms of documentation 
that AMTs use. The study of PCRs complements other types of investigations 
thus providing a fuller picture of the underlying causes of maintenance error. 
Most Commonly Reported Types of PCRs
The results of this study show that the majority of PCRs represent requests 
for additional procedural information followed by requests to add or change the 
language to improve clarity. These findings suggest that AMMs may not provide 
sufficient detail and fail to consider the task from the perspective of the AMT. It is 
common that an AMT is unable to perform a procedure as described in the manual 
due to interference from aircraft structures or systems that are not acknowledged 
in the procedure. Usability testing or proofing by the user population would aid in 
identification of ambiguous phrasing, poor sequencing of steps, or missing proce-
dural information. Likewise, task analyses would help ensure that procedures 
exist for tasks commonly performed in the field. AMTs spend much of their time 
troubleshooting discrepancies on the airplane (e.g., erroneous fuel pressure indi-
cators or inability to control cabin temperature); however, manuals may not include 
procedures for the sorts of problems that commonly occur during regular aircraft 
operations (Chaparro et al., 2004).
Errors by ATA Chapter 
The majority of PCRs cited procedures found in ATA Chapters 27 (Flight con-
trols), 32 (Landing gear), and 71 (Powerplant). It is interesting to note that the 
NTSB report of the Air Midwest accident cited procedures in Chapter 27. The rate 
of occurrence of errors in these chapters may be due to several factors including: 
1) a potential reporting bias due to the safety implications of errors in these pro-
cedures; 2) the larger number of individual procedures related to these systems 
and 3) the overall complexity of these systems. As a case in point, consider 
chapter 71 (Powerplant), which includes maintenance tasks pertaining to elec-
tronic sensors, hydraulic & pneumatics, environmental and fuel systems. 
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Filtering of PCRs
PCRs report discrepancies in the AMM, which AMTs and customer service 
engineers believe warrant revision of the manual; however, the frequency and 
distribution of discrepancies found in this study likely represent a conservative 
estimate. AMTs with more experience or access to experienced co-workers may 
workaround known errors. Furthermore, AMTs are not equally likely to submit 
PCRs. This is corroborated by the findings of Chaparro and Groff (2001) that 
approximately 50% AMTs reported only occasionally, rarely or never reporting 
errors in the manual. AMTs cited several reasons for not reporting errors including 
the lack of feedback from manufacturers regarding submitted PCRs and their 
observation that errors persisted in the manual even after submitting PCRs. Poten-
tial PCRs are further culled by customer service engineers, on-site manufacturer 
representatives, and systems engineers who decide whether a PCR warrants a 
change in the manual. PCRs, which identify issues that affect safety and technical 
errors (e.g. incorrect part numbers, settings, clearances etc), receive the highest 
priority. This emphasis may explain the paucity of PCRs citing the clarity of proce-
dures, spelling errors or typos. 
Relationship between Rule Violations, Incidents, and PCRs 
The relationship between discrepancies in the AMM and maintenance error is 
not a direct causal one. In most cases, the discrepancies found in the maintenance 
manual prompt requests for clarification that delay completion of maintenance 
tasks. Inspections of work and post maintenance functional tests reduce the likeli-
hood of a maintenance error going undetected. Nevertheless, as recent mainte-
nance related accidents demonstrate, the safety net can fail as the result of the 
random collusion of factors including a poorly written maintenance procedure, an 
inexperienced mechanic, time pressure, and failure of the supervisor to review the 
work and perform functional tests. Improved AMMs would eliminate a source of 
problems that contribute to errors and mishaps observed downstream.
Figure 1 illustrates the possible outcomes of the executing of a maintenance 
procedure by an AMT and summarizes the types of rule-related behaviors that may 
result and where PCRs and incident reports (e.g., report of incident filed in a data-
base MEDA, HFACS-ME, ASRS) are likely to be generated. This figure was 
adapted from an earlier figure by Reason and Hobbs (2003). Beginning at the top 
left of the figure the AMT must first identify whether the AMM contains a mainte-
nance procedure for the task. If a maintenance procedure exists then completion 
of the task will depend on the degree to which the procedure is complete, clear, 
and correct. The AMT has two choices should no maintenance procedure exist: 
they may contact the manufacturers’ technical support for assistance thus gener-
ating a PCR or attempt to accomplish the task by relying on their expertise or that 
of their peers. The latter choice has several possible outcomes: the task could be 
performed correctly (i.e., a correct improvisation); alternatively, the task could be 
performed incorrectly and is detected during functional tests (i.e., a mistake) and 
an incident report is filed; or finally the task is performed incorrectly and is not 
detected until a later date (i.e., latent error). 
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Figure 1. Schematic of aircraft maintenance task completion and possible out-
comes.
As shown in Figure 1, a maintenance procedure may still fail to meet the 
needs of the AMT if it is difficult to follow or cannot be executed as described. A 
maintenance procedure may identify the wrong access panels or fail to take into 
account physical obstructions that prevent the removal of a component. Again, 
the AMT may contact technical support or attempt to identify an alternative solu-
tion. Finally, there are instances where the manual is technically correct but not 
followed by the AMT resulting in a workaround. The FAA officially discourages 
Workarounds as a maintenance procedure is supposed to be followed exactly as 
written. This may not always be possible. Technical writers report instances where 
functional tests described in the manual are technically correct but are not well 
suited to the task performed by the AMT. One representative example is a case 
where an AMT was replacing a part of a larger system. The functional test pro-
vided in the manual described a complex, time-consuming functional test for the 
entire system as would occur during assembly of the aircraft. However, no proce-
dure was available for functional testing after the removal and replacement of one 
subcomponent as is common in the field.
Critical incident reports and PCRs serve several valuable functions. Critical 
incident error-reporting systems are in place to initiate corrections to the mainte-
nance process within a maintenance facility (i.e., repair station), whereas, the 
PCR error-reporting system is in place to make corrections to the AMM. PCRs 
differ from incident reporting systems in the following ways:  1) PCRs are gener-
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tered at one or more levels within an organization before a change is made to the 
AMM; 3) the information contained in a PCR is specific allowing for a more fine-
grained analysis of problems in the AMM; and 4) PCRs may capture deficiencies 
in the AMM that may become critical incidents, as well as those that may cause 
latent errors. 
Human Factors and Technical Writing
The problems reported in AMMs are expected given that draft procedures are 
not evaluated by users; rather, they are reviewed by other writers and engineers. 
Usually, the technical writer, in consultation with an engineer, writes a draft of a 
maintenance procedure using engineering drawings, system descriptions, and 
operational functional tests. The procedure is then circulated amongst members of 
the technical writing team and system experts for proofing (Chaparro, Rogers, 
Hamblin, & Chaparro, 2004). However, the emphasis is on technical correctness 
rather than usability of the procedure. This is evident in the relatively low number 
of technical errors reported in PCRs. Unfortunately technical correctness does not 
ensure usability. Some of the problems with maintenance procedures also derive 
from the fact that they are often based on assembly instructions used on the man-
ufacturing line and consequently do not adequately address typical problems of 
maintaining an operational aircraft including troubleshooting systems to identify 
defective components or replacing single components rather then entire systems. 
Recent Developments
Following, the Air Midwest accident, the NTSB made two recommendations 
specifically addressing human factors related issues in maintenance documenta-
tion.
Recommendation A-04-13:  Require that 14 CFR Part 121 (FAA 2008c) air 
carriers and aircraft manufacturers review all work card and maintenance 
manual instructions of critical flight systems and ensure the accuracy and 
usability of these instruction so that they are appropriate to the level of 
training of the mechanics performing the work.
Recommendation A-04-16:  Require that 14 CFR Part 121 air carriers imple-
ment comprehensive human factors programs to reduce the likelihood of 
human error in (Federal, 2008c) aviation maintenance.
A summary of the FAA response to the NTSB recommendations can be viewed 
on-line at http://www.ntsb.gov/safetyrecs/private/QueryPage.aspx. In the case of 
recommendation A-04-13, the FAA responded that the term “critical flight systems” 
was ambiguous and the FAA would work with the manufacturers to clarify the 
meaning of the term and develop appropriate procedures. Also, that upon the res-
olution of another safety recommendation, the FAA would “issue a Fight Standards 
Information Bulletin (FSIB) to inspectors to ensure air carrier maintenance man-
uals address the maintenance procedures on critical flight systems.” The FAA 
responded to safety recommendation A-04-16 by stating, “Rulemaking activities 
will be initiated for 14 CFR 121.375 to require that air carrier maintenance training 
programs be approved by the FAA.”
 The NTSB classified both responses as unacceptable noting that in the case 
of A-04-13 that the “FAA’s plan to issue an FSIB does not adequately address the 
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intent of this recommendation, which is to establish a program to ensure that 
procedures for flight-critical systems described by airline work cards and mainte-
nance manuals are both accurate and usable.” Likewise, the safety board 
expressed some concern that the FAA did not understand the intent of safety 
recommendation A-04-16. The board noted that many human factors issues in 
aviation maintenance including the “availability of proper technical reference doc-
uments and guidance, availability of proper and appropriate tools and fixtures, 
and procedures related to continuation of work from one shift to the next are not 
related to training” and that a program limited to training would not address these 
issues. The FAA has not responded to the last round of NTSB comments  dated 
October 12, 2005.
Summary
Analysis of PCRs revealed that the cited problems with the maintenance doc-
umentation stem largely from incomplete maintenance procedures and ambig-
uous phrasing and that these problems are comparable across manufacturers 
and aircraft size (FAR Part 25 and 121). The problems reported in PCRs are 
similar to problems cited in previous studies of critical incident reports and sur-
veys.
Previous research has shown that use of user-centered evaluative methods 
in developing aviation maintenance documentation is effective in revealing poten-
tial errors prior to publication of the maintenance manual. These methods may be 
preferable to the current process that relies on other technical writers, design 
engineers, and customer technical support engineers in lieu of AMTs. AMTs offer 
a unique perspective including their familiarity with work place constraints and 
extensive task-related knowledge that may not be represented by the other 
groups referenced in the technical documentation development process. This 
analysis of PCRs reveals similarities in the types of errors reported by users and 
those found using evaluation techniques including cognitive walkthrough, single-
user and co-discovery user performance testing(A. Chaparro et al., 2004). 
A breakdown of PCRs as a function of ATA chapters showed that procedures 
in Chapters 27 (Flight controls), 32 (Landing gear), and 71 (Powerplant) were 
found to have the highest percentage of PCRs. Given the additional cost of eval-
uating procedures, this information can be used to develop selection guidelines 
as to the most critical procedures to evaluate. 
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